ISS and Glass Lewis gear up for 2026: both launch policy surveys, Glass Lewis previews methodology changes
Policy surveys
ISS and Glass Lewis are trying to capture evolving views on the use of performance-based vs service-based equity; shifts in the political and economic climate and regulatory landscape; increased director responsibilities; and DEI risks. Several of the executive pay and pay-related governance questions are influenced by executive orders, Supreme Court decisions, tariffs and the recent SEC roundtable on the future of executive compensation disclosure. See SEC roundtable: SEC lays the groundwork for significant changes to executive pay disclosure for a discussion of the roundtable.
The Glass Lewis survey is more extensive than the ISS survey but there’s overlap as shown on the following table:
| Topic | ISS | GL |
|---|---|---|
| Executive compensation | ||
| • Performance-vs service-based equity | X | X |
| • Modification of in-flight awards and special grants | X | X |
| • Benchmarking reassessments | X | |
| • LTI grant size | X | |
| • Make-whole awards | X | |
| • Equity plan proposals | X | |
| • Ad-hoc adjustments to severance benefits | X | |
| • Future of executive pay disclosures | X | |
| • Executive security disclosures | X | |
| • Engagement; SOP responsiveness | X | X |
| Excessive non-employee director pay | X | X |
| Board diversity, ESG and DEI | X | X |
| Proposals on independent board chairs and overboarding | X | |
Executive compensation
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Performance- vs service-based equity
For the second year in a row, both proxy advisors are exploring whether to change their stance on the use of service-based awards as the primary equity vehicle. For example, a failure to apply performance conditions to a majority of an executive’s awards could trigger a negative say-on-pay (SOP) recommendation from ISS. Neither proxy advisor made changes for the 2025 proxy season but given the continued debate (including as part of the SEC roundtable), they both are seeking further feedback:
- ISS is asking whether granting time-based equity with an extended time horizon (either as the only vehicle or as part of the equity mix) is acceptable, how long the time horizon should be (e.g., three-year vesting with two-year retention requirement, five-year vesting with no retention requirement, etc.) and the portion of net shares that should be retained (e.g., 50%, 75% or 100%).
- Glass Lewis is asking stakeholders to weigh in on the following justifications for time-based awards: they are common among the company’s competitors and/or industry; the company is newly public and should have a grace period; the overall vesting conditions are longer than typical; due to macroeconomic factors and/or industry-wide instability, setting long-term targets is too challenging currently, but structure will be revisited annually; there are retention concerns as recent performance-based awards haven’t paid out; long-term goals are in flux due to a substantial pivot in business strategy; the company is in a high-growth stage of development and setting long-term goals would needlessly hamper innovation.
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Modification of in-flight awards and special grants
Both proxy advisors generally take a negative view of modifications to in-flight incentives and special awards without a compelling rationale.
- ISS asks if it should take a different position when the modifications relate to the removal of environmental, social governance (ESG) or diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) metrics. ISS is also asking respondents to list specific ESG/DEI metrics that shouldn’t be removed without a compelling rationale.
- Glass Lewis wants to know how boards should respond when executive incentive outcomes reflect elements of financial, operational or share price performance that have been materially impacted by tariffs. Specifically, should companies: take action to ensure executives aren’t demoralized/unfairly punished by forces outside their control (e.g., using supplementary grants or making discretionary adjustments); make non-GAAP adjustments; take no action; or the answer depends on the context, rationale disclosed and materiality of any adjustments.
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Benchmarking reassessmentsAccording to Glass Lewis, a company typically reassesses executive pay levels when the company increases in size or scope (e.g., through a merger), but rarely reassesses when company size or scope decreases (e.g., following a spin-off or divestment). Glass Lewis wants to know if this is acceptable or if the failure to reassess and reduce pay would impact an investors’ SOP vote.
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LTI grant sizeGlass Lewis wants to know if investor voting policies include an absolute threshold for the size of long-term incentive grants (e.g., as a percentage of base salary or specific cash value), after which additional scrutiny or justification is needed.
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Make-whole awardsAfter noting the rise in make-whole grants to new executives to compensate them for awards forfeited on leaving their prior employer, Glass Lewis is asking (for the second time) about disclosure expectations. In particular, Glass Lewis wants to know if make-whole awards should be subject to the same or a lower level of scrutiny as other sign-on awards.
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Equity plan proposalsGlass Lewis wants respondents to rank the importance of the following when evaluating equity plan proposals: qualitative provisions such as repricings and single triggers; absolute or relative burn rate; absolute or relative dilution and overhang; dilutive impact of share request; size of share request compared to current usage and expected needs; and historical and expected cost.
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Ad-hoc adjustments to severance benefitsGlass Lewis wants feedback on when ad-hoc adjustments are warranted or reasonable. Choices are: to align with the expansion of restrictive covenants, such as increasing severance multiples from 1x to 1.5x in exchange for increasing the length of a noncompete from 12 to 18 months; to recognize exceptionally long tenure (e.g., 15 years), or whenever necessary in the judgment of the committee as long as amounts aren’t excessive.
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Future of executive pay disclosuresTo prepare for the possibility of reduced SEC-mandated disclosures following the SEC executive compensation disclosure roundtable, Glass Lewis wants to know what elements are important to communicate and assess pay programs. Choices are: incentive plan design (metrics, weightings, performance goals and vesting provisions); rationale for potentially concerning pay practices (e.g., upward discretion, one-off awards, etc.); reconciliation between GAAP and non-GAAP metrics used in incentive plans; standard compensation tables (e.g., Summary Compensation Table, etc.); SEC-mandated pay-versus-performance disclosure (including compensation actually paid); and CEO pay ratio (including median employee pay disclosure).
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Executive security disclosuresGlass Lewis wants stakeholder views on current SEC guidance that security provided to executives at their personal residence or on personal travel should be reported as a perk, including when provided in relation to an ongoing security threat.
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Engagement; SOP responsiveness
Recent SEC staff guidance may deter investors from engaging with companies or providing feedback. The guidance provides that engagement on executive pay issues with the purpose of changing or influencing control may require an institutional investor to file as an active (vs passive) investor, which comes with more onerous reporting requirements and scrutiny.
- ISS assesses compensation committee responsiveness when a company receives low SOP support by reviewing proxy disclosure of shareholder engagement efforts, including the feedback received and how the company responded. However, ISS is seeking feedback on how it should view a company’s disclosure that it was unable to obtain shareholder feedback on executive pay concerns and whether pay program changes can be considered responsive without disclosed shareholder feedback.
- Glass Lewis is asking investors if they have made, or are considering making, changes to voting or engagement policies and practices in response to the new SEC guidance.
Excessive non-employee director pay
Both proxy advisors seek input on outlier non-executive director pay:
- ISS identifies companies with outlier non-executive director pay by comparing pay levels to those of other companies within the same index and 4-digit GICS industry group. ISS may also review the pay structure to identify problematic pay practices (e.g., performance equity awards, excessive perquisites, or retirement programs). If ISS identifies an outlier or finds problematic pay practices, it provides cautionary language in proxy reports but doesn’t recommend against members of the committee that approves director pay unless there are issues for two consecutive years without a rationale. ISS is seeking input on situations that might warrant an adverse recommendation in the first year (e.g., excessive perks, pay that exceeds executive pay).
- Glass Lewis is seeking input on how respondents evaluate significant (outlier) increases in director fees when the pay program is otherwise aligned with best practices.
Board diversity, ESG and DEI
Both proxy advisors seek information on company and investor approaches to board diversity, ESG and DEI:
ISS stopped looking at boards’ gender, racial and ethnic diversity when making vote recommendations in director elections in February 2025 but continued to provide data to investors upon request. Given that many investors requested board diversity data, ISS is seeking feedback on, among other things, the following topics:
- How important is it that companies disclose information on board, executive and workforce diversity (including diversity targets) and DEI risk.
- Whether shareholder proposals on DEI topics should be considered case by case or rejected as an unnecessary distraction for companies.
- Which factors are relevant (e.g., gender, race and/or ethnicity, skills and experience, tenure, or other factors).
Glass Lewis is seeking feedback on:
- Whether respondents expect boards to maintain certain levels of diversity in various categories (e.g., age, tenure, gender, race/ethnicity, background, skills and experiences).
- Expectations for proxy disclosures (e.g., percent of racial/ethnic diversity, board’s approach to considering diversity in director nominations, whether the board has a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the pool of candidates, and skills disclosure).
- How respondents are reacting to growing anti-ESG sentiment (e.g., stepped back from ESG-related initiatives, strengthened and taken a more progressive approach to ESG, or no change).
- If approach was changed, for which issues (environmental, diversity, other social issues).
- For which diversity-related issues should companies provide disclosures (e.g., only what’s required for Form 10-K human capital management disclosure, EEO-1 reporting, expanded non-EEO-1 employee demographic information, disclosure of employee diversity. considerations in sustainability reporting or on websites, company wide diversity-related goals and targets).
- Setting sectoral/operational differences aside, whether investors are taking the same approach to voting and engaging with companies on ESG issues across all markets.
Proposals on independent board chairs and overboarding
Given independent board chair proposals seldom receive majority support unless there are company-specific factors suggesting the board isn’t exercising sufficient oversight over management, ISS wants to understand when respondents would be comfortable with non-independent chairs (e.g., robust lead director role).
Separately, ISS is revisiting whether to change the current limit for non-employee directors serving on other boards from five to three, four, six, or no limits.
Glass Lewis P4P methodology changes
Glass Lewis is revising its proprietary pay-for-performance (P4P) methodology for the 2026 proxy season. Key changes include:
- Numeric quantitative scores ranging from 0 to 100 will replace the A to F letter grading system.
Five concern levels ― ranging from “severe” to “negligible” ― will correspond to a 20-point range (e.g., scores of 0 to 20 trigger a severe concern).
P4P evaluation period will be extended from three to five years.
Additional financial tests will include CEO compensation actually paid (CAP), as disclosed in the proxy pay-versus-performance table, vs total shareholder return (TSR) relative to peers.
P4P tests will be performed only on companies with:
- Three or more consecutive years of comparable compensation data;
- Three or more consecutive years of comparable financial data, covering a minimum of four financial metrics, including TSR plus three metrics from among ROE, ROA, EPS, Revenue, OCF, TBV, and FFO; and
- At least 10 but not more than 15 industry and market cap peer companies (selected using Glass Lewis’ proprietary methodology) that meet the same pay and financial data requirements.
| Test | Comparator Group | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Granted CEO pay vs TSR | GL Peers | Five-year weighted average (requires three years’ data to perform test). |
| 2 | Granted CEO pay vs financial performance | GL Peers | Five-year weighted average (requires three years’ data to perform test) with four-metric minimum TSR, revenue growth, ROA, and ROE are standard for all companies; up to two additional metrics may be included, with EPS growth and operating cash flow growth most common. |
| 3 | CEO STI payout as % of target vs TSR | General market benchmarks | Average of five one-year measurement periods. |
| 4 | Total granted NEO pay (including CEO) vs financial performance | GL Peers | Five-year weighted average measurement period (requires three years’ data to perform test). |
| 5 | CEO CAP vs TSR | GL market cap peers | Ratio of five-year aggregate CEO CAP and five-year cumulative TSR (each from PVP table). |
| 6 | Qualitative test | N/A | One-off awards; upward discretion exercised; fixed pay greater than variable pay; uncapped/undisclosed incentives; excessive maximum LTIP payout; short vesting period for LTI; non-disclosure of performance goals. |
What’s next?
The ISS survey will close on August 22 at 5 pm ET. After considering the responses, ISS will open a public comment period on key proposed changes, typically in late November, and likely issue final policies in December. Updated policies, which may cover topics not included in the survey, will be effective for annual meetings held on or after February 1, 2026.
Glass Lewis launched a survey for the first time last year and may again this year. Its updated policies will likely be effective for annual meetings held on or after January 1, 2026.
is a Partner and Senior Legal Consultant in Mercer's Law & Regulatory Group (L&R) based in New York. She specializes in technical legal and regulatory issues affecting executive compensation and corporate governance. She focuses on SEC disclosure, tax, employment and change in control agreements, equity programs, and employee benefit issues that arise in the context of corporate transactions and initial public offerings.
is a Senior Legal Consultant in Mercer's Law & Regulatory Group (L&R) based in Washington DC. She provides expert analyses on a variety of US and Canadian compliance and policy matters, and advises clients on securities and corporate governance issues affecting executive pay in North America.
is a Parter and the Head of Mercer’s US & Canada Executive Rewards Practice. He advises US and Canadian companies’ Compensation Committees and senior leadership teams on a wide variety of executive compensation topics and Board of Director pay issues. In addition, he leads the go-to-market strategies, as well as the development of intellectual capital and technical solutions, for Mercer’s Executive Rewards Practice in the US and Canada.