Companies see strong support for executive pay programs during 2025
2025 vs. 2024 stats
Indicators of strong but, in some cases, slightly lower support this proxy season as of Dec. 1 include:
- Average support levels. Support at all-size companies is averaging 90.2% (down slightly from 90.5% this time in 2024 and 90.4 for all of 2024). Support at S&P 500 companies is averaging 90.0% (up slightly from 89.8% this time last year, and 89.6% for all of 2024).
- Failure rates. Failure rates are slightly higher than this time last year and for all of last year for all-size companies. Failure rates are slightly higher than this time last year and the same for all of last year for S&P 500 companies:
- Out of 3,062 all-size companies reporting results, 1.5% (45) received less than 50% support, compared to 1.2% (38 out of 3,069) as of this time last year, and 1.4% (43 out of 3,184) for all of 2024.
- Out of 474 S&P 500 companies reporting results, 1.3% (6) received less than 50% support, compared to 1.2% (6 out of 482) as of this time last year, and 1.3% (6 out of 480) for all of 2024.
- Support of at least 90%. 70.8% of all-size companies received at least 90% support (down slightly from 70.9% this time in 2024, and 70.7% for all of 2024); 69.6% of S&P 500 companies received at least 90% support (down from 71.4% this time last year, and 70.0% for all of 2024).
- More ISS against recommendations and more impact on failure rates. ISS has recommended shareholders vote against say-on-pay proposals at all-size companies at a rate of 12.8% (up from 12.1% as of this time in 2024, and 12.3% for all of 2024) and 9.7% at S&P 500 companies (up from 7.5% as of this time in 2024, and 8.1% for all of 2024).
Failures where ISS issued an “against” recommendation are higher at all-size companies (10.5% vs. 8.6% as of this time in 2024, and 9.0% for all of 2024) but lower for S&P 500 companies (13.0% vs. 16.7% as of this time in 2024, and 15.4% for all of 2024).
Reasons for “no” votes continue to include pay-for-performance disconnects, failure to engage with shareholders after a year of low support, significant one-time or special awards, and categorizing executive terminations as retirements but paying severance.
is a Senior Legal Consultant in Mercer's Law & Regulatory Group (L&R) based in Washington DC. She provides expert analyses on a variety of US and Canadian compliance and policy matters, and advises clients on securities and corporate governance issues affecting executive pay in North America.
is a Partner and Senior Legal Consultant in Mercer's Law & Regulatory Group (L&R) based in New York. She specializes in technical legal and regulatory issues affecting executive compensation and corporate governance. She focuses on SEC disclosure, tax, employment and change in control agreements, equity programs, and employee benefit issues that arise in the context of corporate transactions and initial public offerings.
is the Manager of Executive Rewards Data and Research supporting the U.S./Canada executive compensation practice. He oversees the research and publication of several executive compensation-related studies produced by the practice throughout the year; and works with consultants to deliver tailored research solutions to their clients. Carlo has extensive experience analyzing executive compensation programs, both as a consultant and a corporate governance research analyst.